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Background 
 
During the ILRI pig value chain assessment with pig producers in Kamuli, Masaka and Mukono 
districts, African swine fever (ASF) disease and parasite infections especially worms and mange were 
identified as the common pig health problems. ASF was the most critical having a fatality rate of 
77.5% according to pig farmers (Dione et al., 2014; Ouma et al., 2014). Though many farmers are 
threatened by the disease, there is not adequate information about the level of risk of disease 
spread along the pig value chain (from the input suppliers to the consumers). It is against this 
background that the ILRI team visited Masaka district from 29th September to 4th October 2014 to 
conduct Key Informant Interviews (KII) with key stakeholders and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
with value chain actors that included input suppliers (vets, drug and feed stockists, piglet producers), 
pig producers (farmers and boar keepers), collectors and bulkers, transporters, wholesalers, 
retailers, processors, and consumers. This was aimed at appreciating the perceptions of the value 
chain actors about ASF as well as to document their recommendations towards sustainable 
biosecurity measures against the disease. 
 
Objectives 
 
The prime objectives of this fact-finding mission were; 
a. to identify the key management and operational functions identified by value chain actors as 
having the potential to affect the risk of ASF transmission among farms  
b. to have participants identify economically and logistically feasible operational approaches 
that are expected to reduce the potential risk of disease transmission and spread 
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Study sites and data collection 
 
Study sites 
Masaka district is located in the Central region and have the highest pig density in the country (>50 
heads/km2) with three value chain domains (VCDs) represented, namely rural production for rural 
consumption (R-R), rural production for urban consumption (R-U) and peri-urban/urban production 
for urban consumption (U-U) (Ouma et al., 2014). The pig production is hindered by the endemicity 
of ASF which causes significant economic loses to farmers (Atuhaire et al., 2013; Dione et al., 2014). 
Several outbreaks are reported annually especially during the dry season.  
 
Participant selection  
The participants were randomly chosen by the District Veterinary Officer in consultation with the 
research team from different sub-counties participating in the smallholder value chain projects in 
Uganda.  
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Twenty key informants constituted by community and expert opinion leaders were invited in a 
meeting in the form of a half day workshop. The invited participants had knowledge about the 
disease and most of them have responsibilities in relation of the disease in the community. Among 
these, the deputy speaker of Kyesiiga sub-county, 4 Local Council IIIs, 3 area veterinary officers, the 
pig farmers cooperative leader, the district women leader, the district commercial officer, 2 police 
officers, the Masaka prison farm officer, the vice chairman of Kabonera sub-county, the district 
veterinary officer, the community youth leader, the district production secretary, butcher’s leader 
and the trader’s leader group leaders. 
 
Focus Group Discussions 
FGDs were undertaken with seven value chain actors: Farmers, communal village boar keepers, 
veterinary services suppliers, drug stockists, feed stockists, traders and butchers/pork joint owners 
were invited. In each category 8 individuals were invited to the session, except for farmers where 40 
were invited (20 in the rural and 20 in the urban areas). FGDs sessions were conducted for each 
group and sessions were facilitated by trained local staff together with the project staff. The tool was 
pretested and refined before being used. 
 
Group sessions and key informants interviews 
The group sessions involved five major exercises as explained below; 
Assessment of knowledge of ASF disease  
 Here, the participants were asked about their knowledge of the ASF disease. This included 
description of characteristics like the local name of the disease, its clinical signs, the main route of 
transmission and dissemination, its treatment, prevention measures and the main effect of the 
disease on pigs. 
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  
  
 
  
a. Identification of hotspots of ASF along the value chain 
With the aid of a value chain map, the participants were asked to discuss among themselves, the 
hotspots for ASF transmission along the value chain and reach a consensus about which value chain 
nodes rank highest in the spread of the disease. The focus group discussions utilised the 
proportional piling tool to rank the different hotspots across the pig value chain. 
 
 
 
Identification of hotspots of ASF along the value chain 
With the aid of a value chain map, the participants were asked to discuss among themselves, the 
hotspots for ASF transmission along the value chain and reach a consensus about which value chain 
nodes rank highest in the spread of the disease. The focus group discussions utilised the 
proportional piling tool to rank the different hotspots across the pig value chain. 
 
 
a. Constraints faced by VC actors in the prevention and control  of ASF outbreaks; 
Here, the participants were guided through identification of the main constraints to  
 
Constraints faced by VC actors in the prevention and control of ASF outbreaks  
Here, the participants were guided through identification of the main constraints to prevention and 
control of ASF outbreaks and the use of pairwise comparison to determine which of those 
constraints are the most important. Five major constraints were selected by each focus group.  
   
Group discussions with vet suppliers from Kabonera, Masaka  (left) and Key informant interviews (right) 
(Photocredit: ILRI /Brian Kawuma) 
 
Veterinary service providers in Masaka district identifying hotspots for the spread of ASF using proportional 
piling. (Photo credit: ILRI /Brian Kawuma) 
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Problem-opportunity matrix 
For this section, the participants reviewed the constraints identified above and were tasked with 
coming up with opportunities for tackling these problems in terms of what should be done, who 
should do it, and how it could get done.  
 
Recommendation for biosecurity measures 
For this exercise, participants were requested to deliberate on and recommend likely biosecurity 
measures against ASF, ranking them according to their effectiveness in ASF control, the ease of 
implementation, gender responsiveness and economic feasibility. For these parameters, the scale 
was high for positive rating (i.e. very easy, very effective, gender responsive, very feasible) and low 
for negative rating (hard to implement, ineffective, gender irresponsive or expensive). It was also 
pertinent to tag a timeline to these measures to illustrate how soon they could be implemented. The 
scale here was short (for 0 to 3years), medium (3 to 5 years) and long (more than 5 years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations for behavioural changes 
For the last exercise, the participants were taken through a self-evaluation where they identified 
common practices or habits that they or their colleagues do intentionally or inadvertently, that 
pause great risk in the transmission of the disease. They were asked to further suggest ways of 
changing this behaviour and identify any foreseen barriers to this behavioural change. 
 
  
Drug stockists from Kabonera sub county in Masaka district, discussing recommendations on 
biosecurity against ASF. (Photo credit: ILRI/ Brian Kawuma) 
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Key observations 
I. The common local name for African swine fever is, ‘omusujja gw’embizzi’. Omusujja is the Luganda 
term for fever. 
 
II. Among the common clinical signs of ASF as described by the participants are; shivering, standing 
hairs, red eyes, loss of appetite, vomiting, reddening of ears, high temperature, sudden and massive 
death, salivation, discoloration of skin and organs, staggering gait, pig becomes aggressive, pigs 
huddle together, blood stained stool, pig doesn’t squeal, and a smell that attracts flies (kawawa). 
 
III. The participants highlighted the following routes of transmission or dissemination of ASF; 
a) Serving pigs on contaminated feed, leftover pork meals, water from utensils,  
b) Vets using unsterilized equipment. Virus also carried on Vets’ garments and motorcycle 
wheels as they move from farm to farm. 
c) Stray animals like free range pigs, dogs and cats that carry infected pig parts from slaughter 
places and farms 
d) Warthogs (wild pigs) and hunters that carry their meat into homes. 
e) Slaughter and sale of affected pigs. 
f) Brokers and traders that move from farm to farm with contaminated foot ware and 
garments 
g) Use of village boars 
h) Poor waste disposal at slaughter places. 
i) Poor disposal of bones by consumers 
j) Direct contact – infected female pigs 
k) People moving from infected places to the farm. 
 
IV. Among the most common hotspots for ASF spread identified by the participants, the pig 
collectors, transporters and traders were ranked as carrying the highest risk because they traverse 
many different farms, villages and sub counties. They were followed by the slaughterers (poor waste 
disposal), pig producers (poor biosecurity and sale of sick animals) and input suppliers (village boars 
spread the disease and vet service suppliers through unsterilized equipment and lack of 
disinfectants). The participants highlighted a potential risk posed by the retailers and consumers but 
almost all agreed that the processors posed the lowest risk because of increased observance of 
quality standards. 
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Key constraints to ASF control 
Among the major constraints to the prevention of ASF as identified by the participants were; 
i. Difficulty in restricting visitors on farms/ Farmers visit peers and carry disease to their 
farms 
ii. Poor Hygiene practices and limited use of disinfection technology  e.g. footbaths 
iii. Weak laws and regulations regarding trade in dead and sick pigs, illegal movement and 
illegal slaughters, no proper procedures for buyers on the farm, lack of pork inspectors 
iv. Inadequate veterinary / extension services 
v. Poor infrastructure on farms and use of free range systems. 
vi. Use of village boars which increases risk of infection of sows and vice versa 
vii. Vet services providers moving from farm to farm and do not change equipment 
viii. Limited Knowledge about ASF epidemiology 
ix. Limited research on vaccine and epidemiology of ASF 
x. Corruption and unethical practices by value chain actors 
xi. Proximity to the forest which serves as a home for wild pigs that are vectors of the 
disease 
xii. Lack of organized farmer groups amongst actors at the same level which would act as a 
source of entry / training to such communities 
xiii. Lack of centralized slaughter place at parish level and a district abattoir which could be a 
collection point for pigs 
xiv. Social contract which requires farmers to share boars putting animals at risk  
xv. Poverty which causes farmers to reduce losses by selling sick animals and buyers to eat 
sick animals. 
xvi. Raw material for compounding feeds that are at time contaminated 
xvii. Stray dogs that move from butchers to farms spreading disease. 
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Key recommendations 
Having identified the constraints above, the participants made the following recommendations 
towards the prevention and control of the spread of ASF: 
 
 Conduct trainings on biosecurity measures for all Value chain actors (use of disinfectant, 
change pig’s water daily, clean feed troughs before replacing food, restrict visitors to the 
pig farm) 
 Advise farmers to build proper housing structures / Have concrete floor pens 
 Each farm should have its own boar or where possible, have separate communal boar 
 Use of artificial insemination 
 Develop rapid diagnosis kits for ASF reaching village levels 
 Establishment of central slaughter places at parish levels & abattoir at district 
 Establishment of demos emphasizing good practices, conduct & management and 
organise see and learn tours for value chain actors 
 Put in place and enforce pig movement by-laws 
 Launch a campaign against the spread of ASF, seminars, radio talk shows, posters 
 Value chain actors to form organised groups (Associations or cooperatives) which will lead 
to behavioural change by peer influence 
 Vets should disinfect equipment between animals and farms 
 Desist from buying or selling sick pigs & products 
 Be vigilant about disease outbreak 
 Advise farmers to fence off their farms to keep off stray animals 
 Advise farmers to wash and disinfect clothing and boots used in pig houses 
 Awards / public recognition of model value chain actors 
 Put sign posts at gates of the farms with instructions of what the 
visitors/veterinarians/traders should do to or stop trespassing 
 Traders should buy piglets from known sources 
 
 Specific recommendation by men farmers 
 Husbands should work together with wives and families 
 Both husband and wife should plan and budget together (wife and husband) 
 Both husband and wife should share benefits together 
 Separate farm from homestead 
 Change in cultural practices that expects households to welcome all visitors 
 Village teams & taskforces empowered and supported 
 Change from individualism to working in groups and cooperatives 
 Share benefits equally between men and women 
 
 Specific recommendation by women farmers 
 Make use of places of worships ask priests to incorporate the messages in their preaches 
 Learning by seeing 
 Arrange competition and awards for value chains in the same nodes 
 Training toward change of behaviors at sub-county level (awareness, social contract) 
 Trainings on what should be done (not to sell meat from dead animals; control illegal pig 
movement and guidelines for buyers) 
 
Recommendation for behavioural changes 
 Group formation will lead to behavioural change by peer influence 
 Launch campaign against negative practices 
 Mass media as a channel for education 
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 Awards / public recognition of model VC actors 
 Counselling to reduce malice 
 Sensitization about dangers in mindedness 
 Sensitisation on negative attitudes about pig farming (e.g. biyumba, ebimere, ebizzi) 
 Training with see and learn tours to those people with good slaughter facilities, butchers  
and pork joints will help the value chain actors involved to change their ways 
 Join associations peer influence and by-laws will help the value chain actors affected to 
change 
 Organise see and learn tours for farmers so that they will be encouraged to change their 
ways eg. take pig farming as a business 
 Establish farmer village schools where farmers will be given sequenced organized 
knowledge on pig farming and disease control measures 
 Incorporate farming  in the school curriculum right from primary level up to tertiary level 
so that children will grow up when they like treasure farming 
 Places of worship should take positively about cooperatives (farmers) to encourage people 
to join cooperatives ie.  
 Change negative attitudes on cooperatives 
 
Socio-cultural barriers to change 
 Social contract (“Can’t say NO to visitors” it is not acceptable) 
 Cultural believes that men are above women and make decisions 
 Men having more than one woman, so do not have time for their pigs 
 Lack of knowledge on benefits of group formation 
 Individual inadequacies 
 Apathy/stubbornness/indifference 
 Low health status of VC actors (HIV). A lot may not be able to attend training 
 Selfishness of some value chain actors (“they don’t mind as far as they are not affected by 
the disease”) 
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Ways forward  
Analysis of the findings from these interviews and focus group discussions will inform the following 
action points; 
1. Upgrade of the training module on biosecurity taking into account some recommendation 
from the value chain actors 
2. Development gender sensitive participatory training on biosecurity for farmers and other 
value chain actors 
3. Randomized Controlled Trial studies to test the effectiveness of training of farmers and 
other value chain actors on biosecurity measures
12 
 
ANNEX 1: Uganda smallholder pig value chain map (Ouma et al., 2014) 
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Annex 2: Perception of value chains actors on the roles of other value chains 
actors in the disease dissemination of ASF 
  
Value chain actors Farmers  Boar keepers (rural) Traders Butchers/pork joints 
Piglet 
producers/growers 
 Panic sales and movement of sick 
pigs 
 Sell of sick pigs when not sure 
about what are they affected of 
 Feed on swill 
 Mix bones with swill sell sick 
animals  
 Sell of sick pigs 
 Panic sales, moving pigs with 
ropes;  
 servicing at collection points;  
 sell sick animals 
 Sell sick pigs 
 sell piglets without 
knowing their health 
status 
Village boar keepers  Inevitable because most farmers go 
there when sows are on heat 
 Serve many sows 
 Some village boars are taken 
to client's place in case there 
are many sows to be serviced 
 Boar serve several sows  Many farmers within the 
same village use the same 
boar 
Traders (live pigs 
Brokers 
Transporters 
 Make efforts to cover all farms 
evenly, sometimes sell to farmers 
who wish to buy from hem 
 farmers service at collection 
points 
 Traverse several villages and 
move from farm to farm 
spreading the virus 
 Huddle many pigs at 
collection points 
 Movements 
 Malice and greed to infect 
farms to lower the price 
 They collect in big 
numbers and search for 
cheap animals from farm 
to farm 
Backyard slaughters 
Slaughter slabs 
 Improper disposable of waste and 
body part; poor set up causing 
transmission by passersby on 
shoes and clothes 
 Virus carried here by dos and 
people's clothes/shoes 
 Pork from different areas sold to 
many retailers from different 
areas 
 Poor waste disposal 
 Parts picked up by dogs that 
moves to farms 
 Flies might transmit the virus 
 Improper disposable of 
waste 
 No proper disposal of 
waste 
Pork retailers  Buy cheap but infected pork or 
carcass 
 Sell to many households 
 Supermarkets have lower risk 
 Lower risk  Buy cheaper but infected 
pork or carcass 
 Sell to many households 
Supermarkets have lower 
risk 
 Lower risk 
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Annex 3: Perception of value chains actors on the roles of other value chains 
actors in the disease dissemination of ASF (continued) 
 
Value chain actors Farmers  Boar keepers (rural) Traders Butchers/pork joints 
Individual 
households, Pork 
joints, Restaurants 
 Homesteads buy infected meat 
and may feed their pigs on the 
leftover meat and waste water 
from utensils 
 Poor disposal of waste by pork 
joints owners and consumers 
 Homesteads buy infected 
meat and may feed their 
pigs on the leftover meat 
and waste water from 
utensils 
 Poor disposable of left 
overs by consumers 
 Homesteads buy infected 
meat and may feed their 
pigs on the leftover meat 
and waste water from 
utensils 
 Poor disposal of waste by 
pork joints owners and 
consumers 
Vets and village 
vets 
 Cover large areas and us 
unsterilized equipment 
 Some of them are nor 
licensed; serve many farms 
 Cover large territories 
with contaminated 
material 
 Quack vets who 
spread wrong 
information to make 
profit 
 Provide fake drugs and do 
not disinfect 
Feed suppliers  Contaminated ingredients and 
poor feed mixing 
 - 
 Contaminated 
ingredients; poor 
mixing  - 
Vet drugs suppliers 
(drug stockists) 
 Less likely to spread the virus 
because the products are well 
packed and they don’t usually 
travel from farm to farm  - 
 Low risk 
 - 
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Annex 4: Perception of value chains actors on the roles of other value chains 
actors in the disease dissemination of ASF (continued) 
 
Value chain actors Vet suppliers 
 
Drug stockists 
 
Feed stockists 
 
Key informants 
Piglet 
producers/growers 
 They sell piglets at a reduced price 
during outbreak 
 pigs are left roaming; farmers do not 
want to lose alone hence knowingly 
affect other's pigs 
 Sell sick piglets 
 Farmers rarely buy animals from a 
known health status farm; farmers do 
panic sells during outbreaks 
 Sell sick pigs at reduced price 
 Poor housing 
and poor 
hygiene 
 Source of sick animals because 
they do not confine their pigs 
 Sometimes they are unaware 
about the disease and operate 
panic sales 
 Sell piglets from infected farms 
Village boar 
breeders 
 Often sick sows will be taken to boar 
without owner's knowledge 
 few boars in village are used to serve 
many sows 
 Serve sick sows from different places 
because most of the time, boar 
service carries higher priority than 
even treatment 
 Boar service  Serve several sows from 
different places 
Traders (live pigs), 
Brokers. 
Transporters 
 
 They move from farm to farm with 
vehicles which are not disinfected 
 Pigs stay at collection points days 
without treatment they buy sick pigs 
at a reduced price 
 Sick pigs are moved across several 
villages hence spreading the virus on 
their way 
 One collection points where pigs are 
huddled together and often sold back 
to farmers if market is not found 
 Sick pigs moved to slaughter places, 
traverse different locations spreading 
the disease 
 Movements 
from farm to 
farm 
 Spread the virus across the 
village 
 Seek for profit during outbreak 
because of low prices or may 
not be aware that pigs are sick 
Backyard 
slaughters, 
Slaughter slabs 
 Poor hygiene conditions 
 Improper disposable of waste; 
poorly constructed slaughter slabs 
 Poor inspection of carcass post-
mortem; virus disseminated in 
markets in different areas in bags 
and on motorcycles 
 Poor waste disposal 
 Division of tasks with some actors 
rewarded in kinds, ex. Body parts of 
sick pigs (head, hooves, offal’s) 
 Poor waste 
disposal 
 Sell to too 
many retailers 
 Do not observe hygienic 
standards 
 There is poor waste disposal; 
open air slaughtering 
 Butchers may detect the sick 
animals before slaughtering 
but choose to go ahead  
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Annex 5: Constraints faced by value chain actors in the prevention and 
control of ASF  
 
Value chains actors  Constraint 1 Constraint 2 Constraint 3 Constraint 4 Constraint 5 
Key informants  Lack of knowledge on the 
existence of disease/virus 
and necessary control 
measures; Weak Vet 
Services 
 Lack of proper 
slaughter facilities 
 Lack of  policies 
enforcement 
 Lack of rapid 
response during 
outbreak (rapid 
diagnostic tests); 
Lack of Knowledge 
on detection & 
prevention 
 Silent laws of 
transportation 
 Corruption 
 Lack of organized pig 
trading business 
 Weak extension 
Services 
Rural farmers (Men)  No cure   Unrestricted visitors  Weak laws and 
regulation 
 Village boars  Free range pigs due to 
lack of housing. 
Rural farmers 
(Women) 
 Absence of farmer groups 
/association 
 Limited knowledge 
on ASF disease and 
control 
 Less prioritisation 
of pigs by all 
stakeholders 
 Patriarchal 
cultures make 
women less 
assertive and 
hence 
compromise a 
lot. 
 Lack of centralized 
slaughter place both 
at parish and district 
level 
Urban farmers (men)  Stray dogs  Lack of knowledge  Lack of boar  Inadequate Vet 
services 
 Perception of women 
on men’s projects 
Urban farmers 
(women) 
 Lack of central slaughter 
place 
 Few farmer 
associations 
 Limited research  Weak laws  lack of knowledge 
Boar keepers (rural)  Limited knowledge  No Central 
slaughter place 
 Unethical 
behaviour of vets 
 Social contract 
that compels 
farmers to help 
neighbours with 
boar service 
 Corruption 
Urban boar keepers  No centralized slaughter 
place and organized markets 
 Limited knowledge  Inadequate vet 
services 
 Few village 
boars 
 Limited operational 
capital 
Traders  Limited knowledge  Limited capital (to 
build proper 
structures, to 
 Vets do not inspect 
butcher hygiene 
standards 
 Unregulated 
movement 
 Unfavourable policies 
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disinfect farms and 
means of transport) 
Butchers/pork joints  Lack of organized 
groups/associations 
 Inadequate 
knowledge of ASF 
epidemiology 
 Some vets specially 
privates ones do not 
offer genuine 
services (fake drugs) 
 Failure to 
observe animal 
movement act. 
Pig are 
transported 
without 
movement 
permits 
 Limited research on 
vaccine and 
epidemiology of ASF 
Drug stockists  Limited knowledge  Selfishness  Byelaws  Organized groups  Central slaughter place 
Feed stockists  Limited knowledge of VC 
actors on the disease, its 
detection and prevention 
 Inadequate 
Veterinary services 
 No centralized 
slaughter 
 Bad attitude  Unregulated 
movement of animals 
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ANNEX 6: Recommendations by specific value chain actors 
 
Value chain actors Recommendations 
Farmers  Enforcement of laws and regulations; 
 Establish guidelines to visitors 
 Organize training for farmers 
 Use disinfection (footbath) 
 Construct better housing and increase hygiene 
 Train village teams on biosecurity 
 Create  parish Information centres 
 Farmers construct fences around their farms & foot bath with disinfectant 
 Put sign posts at gates of our farms with instructions of what we want our visitors/Veterinarians/traders to do or stop trespassing 
 Arrange trainings on bio-security measures 
 Put in place central slaughter places at parish and district levels 
Veterinary service 
suppliers 
 Follow Ethics as Veterinary service providers 
 Disinfecting between farms (equipment and wear) 
 Seek knowledge and share knowledge  
 Advice farmers on improved pig housing   
 Farmers should use footbaths with disinfectant 
 Farmers should limit visitors into their farms 
 Proper disposal of waste and carcasses  
 Farmers should observe quarantine  
 Disinfect equipment between animals and farms  
 Centralized slaughter slabs 
 Limited knowledge on vet laws and regulations 
Drug stockists  Establishment of central slaughter places at parish levels & abattoir at district  
 Value chain actors to form organized groups (Associations or cooperatives) 
 Put in place and enforce pig byelaws 
 Launch a campaign against the spread of ASF (MDD), seminars, Radio talk shows, posters Develop rapid diagnosis kits for ASF reaching 
village levels 
Feeds stockists; 
 
 Have foot bath at feeds formulation unit 
 No recycling of feed sacks (guinea bags) 
 Construction of proper facilities for feed mixing 
Traders & Butchers  Traders should buy and use a disinfection pump for themselves and their vehicles 
 Strengthen the existing traders association so as to correct all bad practices related to collection, transportation, slaughter, selling of pigs 
and pig products 
19 
 
 Laugh campaign to spread of ASF using media (radio), talk shows, meetings, brochures 
 Establish central slaughter places at parish level and district to improve on the level of hygiene 
Communal village boar 
keepers 
 Boil swill (from households and restaurants) before feeding to pigs 
 Regular disinfection and cleaning of pig pens and farm structures 
 Proper waste management of slaughter waste  
 Proper disposal of food left over from homes (disposal pits)  
 Stop village boar service especially during ASF outbreak 
Key Informants  Enforce quarantine during outbreaks 
  Routine supervision of Butchers & Traders 
  Bye-laws to have all pigs housed 
  Registering all butchers & traders 
  Copy good works of Village Health Teams (VHTs) into ASF control 
  Further study of Indigenous Technical Knowledge (e.g. Urine, Mululuza, other herbs) 
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Annex 7: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for farmers (men) 
 
  
Recommendation 
Who is responsible 
in the VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and Long term 
(more 5 years) 
Disease control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
Enforcement of laws and 
regulations; 
a. Not to sell meat from dead 
animals 
b. Control illegal movement 
c. Guidelines for buyers 
District Veterinary 
Officer (DVO); 
farmers taskforces 
High Low High 
High 
Short 
Guidelines to visitors 
Task forces; 
farmers 
High  High High 
High 
Short 
Training; 
Disinfection (footbath) 
Regulations 
Housing and hygiene 
Traders & butchers 
Task force; vet 
extension staff; 
farmers 
High  High High 
High 
Short 
Village teams on biosecurity 
Pig farmers; DVO; 
ILRI 
High  High High 
High 
Short 
Parish Information centres 
Pig, farmers; area 
vets; DVO 
High  Medium High 
High 
Short 
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Annex 8: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for farmers (women) 
 
Recommendation 
Who is responsible in the 
VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsive
ness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and Long 
term (more 5 years)3) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
Farmers construct fences around 
their farms & foot bath with 
disinfectant 
Farmer High Moderate High 
High 
Short 
Let’s put sign posts at gates of our 
farms with instructions of what we 
want our 
visitors/Veterinarians/traders to do 
or stop trespassing 
Farmer High High High 
High 
Short 
Arrange trainings on bio-security 
measures 
Advocacy 
Farmers; 
Value chain actors; farmer 
leader; district veterinary 
office; 
sub-county council; NGOs 
High Medium High 
High 
Short 
Put in place central slaughter 
places at parish and Dist levels 
District council; 
S/county council; farmer 
leaders; ILRI; NGOs 
High Medium High 
High 
Short 
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Annex 9: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for urban village boar keepers  
 
Recommendation 
Who is 
responsible in the 
VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and Long term 
(more 5 years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic feasibility 
Proper disposal of food left 
overs from homes 
(disposal pits) 
Farmer Medium High High 
High 
Short 
Boil swill (from households 
and restaurants) before 
feeding to pigs 
Farmer High Medium Medium 
High 
Short 
Regular disinfection and 
cleaning of pig pens and 
farm structures 
Farmer High High High 
High 
Short 
Proper waste management 
of slaughter waste 
Butchers High Medium Medium 
High 
Short 
Stop village boar service 
especially during ASF 
outbreak 
Farmers;  village 
boar keepers 
High Medium Low 
High 
Short 
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Annex 10: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their effectiveness for rural village boar keepers  
 
Recommendation 
Who is responsible in 
the VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and Long term 
(more 5 years) 
Disease control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
Improve hygiene at the 
farm 
Farmer High High High 
High 
Short 
Each farm should have its 
own boar 
Farmer High High High 
High 
Short 
Use of Artificial 
insemination 
District veterinary  
office 
High Medium Low 
High 
Medium 
Restrict visitors from farm Farmer High Medium Medium High Short 
Separate communal boar 
from other pigs 
 Farmer 
High Medium Medium High 
 Short 
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Annex 11: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for traders 
 
Recommendation 
Who is responsible 
in the VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) medium 
term( 3-5 years) and Long term (more 5 
years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
Traders should buy and 
use a disinfection pump 
for themselves and their 
vehicles 
Traders High High High 
 
 
High 
Short 
Training of all Value chain 
actors on biosecurity 
Government; 
district veterinary 
office 
High High Medium 
High 
Short 
Proper housing structures 
for pigs to confine pigs 
Farmers  High Medium Medium 
High 
Short 
Do not feed pigs on pig 
products and share farm 
equipment with household 
Farmers High High High 
High 
Short 
Restrict visitors to farm Farmers High High High High Short 
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Annex 12: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for butchers 
 
Recommendation to 
biosecurity 
Who is responsible in the 
VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) 
Gender 
responsive 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and 
Long term (more 5 years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic feasibility 
 Strengthen the existing 
traders association  so as to 
find all bad practices 
related to collection, 
transportation, slaughter 
and selling of pigs and pig 
products 
Traders; veterinary 
officers; DCO 
High  High Medium  
High 
 short 
 Laugh campaign to spread 
of ASF using media (radio), 
talk shows, meetings, 
brochures 
Traders; veterinary 
officers; DCO 
High  High Medium  High  short 
 Establish central slaughter 
places at parish level and 
district to improve on the 
level of hygiene 
 Veterinary officers; 
district council; traders; 
farmer leaders 
 High Medium Medium 
Medium* 
short 
 
*Any actions which lead to centralized collection of animals will not favor to women because it will involve labor for transporting the pigs from 
the farm to the location, which labor is provided by men only (they have motorbikes). Men might take over the activity and the returns from 
sales may not be shared with women at the household. 
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Annex 13: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for veterinary suppliers 
 
Recommendation 
Who is 
responsible in the 
VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) medium 
term( 3-5 years) and Long term (more 5 
years) 
Disease control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
 Housing Farmers High Medium High High short 
 Fencing of farms  Farmers  High  low  low High   
 Buying from safe farms  Farmers  High  Medium High High Short 
 Footbaths with 
disinfectant 
 Farmers  High  High High 
High 
Short 
 Limit visitors  Farmers  High  High  High High Short 
 Proper disposal of 
waste and carcasses 
 Farmers, 
butchers 
 High Medium Medium 
High 
Short 
 Quarantine 
 DVO, local 
leaders 
 High  Low High  
High 
Short 
 Disinfect equipment 
between animals and 
farms 
 Vet service 
suppliers 
 High High High 
High 
Short 
 Centralised slaughter 
slabs 
 ILRI, S/county  High High High 
High 
 Short 
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Annex 14: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for feed stockists 
 
Recommendation 
Who is responsible in 
the VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Timeline: short term (0-3 years) medium 
term( 3-5 years) and Long term (more 5 years) Disease control Ease of implementation  Economic feasibility 
 Have foot bath at 
feeds formulation 
unit 
Feed stockists Medium High High Short 
 No recycling of 
feed sacs 
Feed stockists; 
farmers 
 High High High Short 
 Proper facilitation 
for feed mixing  
Feed stockists High Medium High Short 
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Annex 15: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for drug stockists 
 
Recommendation Who is responsible in the VC? 
Effectiveness (rate between low, moderate, high) Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 
years) medium term( 3-5 
years) and Long term (more 
5 years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic feasibility 
Establishment of central 
slaughter places at parish 
levels & abattoir at 
district 
District council; S/county 
councils; NGOs; ILRI 
High Low Moderate 
 
 
Low 
Medium 
VC actors to form 
organised groups 
(Associations or 
cooperatives) 
District council;  S/county vet 
officers; NGOs 
 High High Moderate 
High 
Short 
Put in place and enforce 
pig by-laws 
District council; S/county 
councils 
 High Moderate Moderate 
High 
 
Short 
Launch a campaign 
against the spread of ASF, 
seminars, Radio 
talkshows, posters 
District & S/county Vet officers, 
Development partners (ILRI) 
 High Moderate Low 
High 
 
High 
 
Short 
Develop rapid diagnosis 
kits for ASF reaching 
village levels 
NARO; ILRI; MAAIF; Makerere 
University 
 High Moderate Low 
High 
Medium 
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Annex 16: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for key informants (group 1) 
 
Recommendation 
Who is 
responsible in 
the VC? 
Effectiveness (High, medium, low) 
Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) medium 
term( 3-5 years) and Long term (more 5 
years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
 Training 
 Vet Services; 
ILRI 
 H H H High Short 
 Quarantine restriction  DVO; LCs; Police  H L L High  Medium 
 Routine supervision of 
Butchers & Traders 
 Area Vets; local 
leaders 
 H H M 
High 
Short 
 Bye-laws to have all pigs 
housed 
 LC3  H L H 
High 
Short 
 Registering all butchers & 
traders 
 LC3  H H H 
High 
Short 
 Copy good works of VHTs into 
ASF control 
 ILRI  H M H 
High 
Medium 
 Further study of Indeginous 
Technical Knowledge (e.g. 
Urine, Mululuza, other herbs) 
 ILRI ? ? ? Medium Long 
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Annex 16: Specific recommendation for biosecurity measures and their 
effectiveness for key informants (group 2)  
 
Recommendation 
Who is responsible in the 
VC? 
Effectiveness (High, medium, low) 
Gender 
responsiveness 
Timeline: short term (0-3 years) 
medium term( 3-5 years) and 
Long term (more 5 years) 
Disease 
control 
Ease of 
implementation  
Economic 
feasibility 
 Training  Vet Services; ILRI  H H H Yes Short 
 Quarantine restriction  DVO; LCs; Police  H L L Yes  Medium 
 Routine supervision of 
Butchers & Traders 
 Area Vets; local leaders  H H M 
Yes 
Short 
 Bye-laws to have all pigs 
housed 
 LC3  H L H 
Yes 
Short 
 Registering all butchers & 
traders 
 LC3  H H H 
Yes 
Short 
 Copy good works of VHTs 
into ASF control 
 ILRI  H M H 
Yes 
Medium 
 Further study of Indigenous 
Technical Knowledge (e.g. 
Urine, Mululuza, other herbs) 
 ILRI ? ? ? Yes Medium 
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